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1 Abstract
Blockchain technology is facing critical issues of scalability, efficiency and sus-
tainability. These problems are necessary to solve if blockchain is to become a
technology that can be used responsibly. Useful quantum computers could po-
tentially be developed by the time that blockchain will be widely implemented
for mission-critical work at financial and other institutions. Quantum comput-
ing will not only cause challenges for blockchain, but can also be harnessed to
better implement parts of blockchain technologies including cryptocurrencies.
We review the work that has been done in the area of quantum blockchain and
hybrid quantum-classical blockchain technology and discuss open questions that
remain.
2 Introduction
Quantum blockchain technology is one of the areas of research in the rapidly
growing field of quantum cryptography [1]. Quantum cryptographic schemes
make use of quantum mechanics in their designs. This enables such schemes to
rely on presumably unbreakable laws of physics for their security. Many quan-
tum cryptography schemes are information-theoretically secure, meaning that
their security is not based on any non-fundamental assumptions. In the design
of blockchain systems, information-theoretic security is not proven. Rather,
classical blockchain technology typically relies on security arguments that make
assumptions about the limitations of attackers’ resources.
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies have applications in many
industries, most notably in the financial industry. The financial applications
of blockchain technologies include cryptocurrencies, insurance and securities is-
suance, trading and selling. Non-financial applications of blockchain technology
have been identified for the music industry, decentralized IoT, anti-counterfeit
solutions, internet applications and decentralized storage, to name a few. In
recent years, blockchain projects have attracted massive attention in these in-
dustries [2].
Despite being a relatively new technology, blockchain has made significant
waves in a number of important industries in a very short time. The two most
known instances of blockchain technologies are Bitcoin [3] and Ethereum [4],
which are the core of modern cryptocurrencies. Ethereum’s focus on smart
contracts has made it a valuable tool for decentralizing numerous industries.
The philosophical implications of decentralized consensus technologies are
far-reaching. Atzori suggested in 2015 that all of society might be restructured
by the blockchain, and that ”the decentralization of government services through
permissioned blockchains is possible and desirable” [5].
In this paper we review work that introduces quantum cryptographic meth-
ods to blockchain technology. We discuss the potential impact and risk associ-
ated with blockchain technology and how the proposed quantum cryptographic
methods attempt to address these risks.
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3 Blockchain Background
Before delving into quantum and hybrid quantum-classical blockchain crytog-
raphy schemes, we will provide a brief summary of the core mechanisms in
blockchain technology. The National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) describes blockchain technology in the following way:
Blockchains are tamper evident and tamper resistant digital ledgers
implemented in a distributed fashion (i.e., without a central reposi-
tory) and usually without a central authority (i.e., a bank, company,
or government). [6]
We will focus primarily on Ethereum’s blockchain implementation in the
following sections since Ethereum’s smart contracts have inspired interesting
work in theoretical quantum blockchain design. Ethereum was introduced by
Vitalik Buterin in 2013 [4]. The most important feature of Ethereum is arguably
its Turing-complete scripting language for smart contracts. Ethereum shares
many basics with other blockchain implementations. Here, we will summarize
the elements of Ethereum that are most relevant to the work that we review [4].
We begin with the basics that are shared by Ethereum and Bitcoin.
3.1 The Ledger
The distributed ledger of a blockchain cryptocurrency maintains the ownership
and status of all existing coins. The ledger is made up of a chain of blocks. The
chain is composed of the blocks’ references to one another. Any valid block’s
header contains a hash of the header of the previous block in the chain. Each
block typically also contains a timestamp, nonce, and list of transactions.
FIG. 1. Chain of Blocks
When a transaction occurs, the current ledger state is mutated by a func-
tion that takes the original state S0 and the transaction TX, and outputs the
next state S1 or an error E. Here, and throughout this paper, ← represents a
transition of a state. Note that in this case, the state is a purely classical data
structure. However, in later sections the same notation will be used to denote
transitions between quantum states.
S1orE ← Apply(S0, TX)
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In Bitcoin, a ledger’s state is composed of all Unspent Transaction Outputs
(UTXO), or simply all of the coins that have been mined but not spent. Each
coin has a 20-byte cryptographic public key which contains information about
its owner and its denomination.
A transaction requires references to each UTXO involved and the crypto-
graphic signatures produced by the UTXO owners’ private keys.
3.2 Proof of Work
To achieve the decentralization of the ledger, a consensus system must be in-
troduced. The goal of the consensus system is to ensure that everyone agrees
on the validity of the transactions that have led to the ledger’s state and their
order. There are several consensus systems that are in use today, including
proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, proof-of-burn and more. The most ubiquitous is
proof-of-work.
Bitcoin’s proof-of-work based system requires that users attempt to publish
transactions constantly. These transactions are published in packaged groups
of a fixed size (1 MB in the case of Bitcoin) called blocks. In addition to a list
of transactions, a block contains a timestamp, one time use block id or nonce,
and a hash of the header of the last most-recent block that contributed to the
ledger. Hence each block maintains a reference to the block that came before
it, and the blocks form a chain as they are published which reflects the order of
their publications in time.
In order for a block to be accepted, its proof of work must be valid. The
validity condition for Bitcoin block is that its double-SHA256 hash is less than
a dynamically adjusted cutoff when interpreted as an integer. A SHA256 hash
is a completely unpredictable result of a pseudorandom function. So, in order
to create a valid block the hash function must be run an arbitrary number of
times until a valid output randomly occurs. Therein lies the work that must be
done to generate a proof-of-work, and the incredible overhead in computational
resources that is encouraged by proof-of-work blockchains.
The time required to generate a valid hash is fundamental to the consensus
system that is employed. If an attacker attempts to move money in a way that
conflicts with the ownership of coins as a result of a transaction record already
accepted by the ledger, the attack is simply rejected. However, an attacker can
try to fabricate a block which points to a valid block that was published before
the block containing the transaction which changed the ownership of the desired
coins. In this case, the attacker will be required to generate a new valid proof-
of-work. While the attacker is occupied doing this, it is assumed that many
other miners are continuing to publish blocks that point to the latest legitimate
block. The rule that is applied to weed out these attacks is simply that the
longest valid chain is taken to be the truth. An attacker would therefore need
to have more computing power than the rest of the network combined in order
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to outpace the speed of the network’s publications and make his/her chain the
longest. This is called a 51% attack and would theoretically be successful.
3.3 Proof of Stake
Proof-of-stake schemes were introduced to address some of the issues with proof-
of-work [7]. Ethereum is currently in the process of switching to a proof-of-stake
scheme. The mining power available to a miner in a proof-of-stake scheme is
proportional to the number of coins owned by the miner. Hence, they are
limited to mining a number of blocks that is proportional to their stake in the
cryptocurrency ecosystem. This offloads the miners’ consumption of electrical
energy resources to currency resources that are more internal to the blockchain.
A driving force behind the creation of proof-of-stake was the dynamic created
by miners selling their coins to pay off their electrical bills. This movement of
cryptocurrency out of the ecosystem has led to drops in cryptocurrency value.
Proof-of-stake schemes have less inherent risk than proof-of-work schemes.
This is clearly illustrated by the proof-of-stake version of the 51% attack. In a
proof-of-stake blockchain, an attacker would need to have 51% of the cryptocur-
rency in the ecosystem to make a successful 51% attack. This would make it
unappealing to attack the ecosystem, since destroying the security and validity
of the system would risk invalidating the attacker’s virtual fortune. This is a
natural deterrent that does not exist in proof-of-work schemes, where any at-
tacker with 51% of the network’s computing power can make a successful 51%
attack regardless of their stake in the ecosystem.
There are cons to any consensus algorithm. In the case of proof-of-stake, one
problem is the explicit association of wealth with the power to influence events.
While the scheme improves on proof-of-work in some ways, it still incentivizes
competition and, similarly to evolutionary systems, rewards the ”fittest” com-
petitor. In this case, fitness is quantified by units of currency rather than
computational capabilities.
3.4 Smart Contracts
One of Ethereum’s most significant contributions to blockchain technology is the
concept of autonomous smart contracts. The addition of smart contracts differ-
entiates so-called ”Blockchain 2.0” technology like Ethereum from ”Blockchain
1.0” technology like Bitcoin [8]. Blockchain 2.0 technologies enable program-
mers to use autonomous agents, the smart contracts, as elements of distributed
software applications called Distributed Applications (DApps).
The top level data structures in Ethereum’s ledger are accounts, rather than
coins. The ledger maintains each account’s 20-byte public-key address, nonce,
balance, contract code and storage.
There are two types of accounts. The first is Externally Owned Accounts,
which are controlled by private keys. The second is Contract Accounts which
are controlled by their contract codes. Externally owned accounts are similar
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to those used by Bitcoin, and can be used in transactions as described previ-
ously. Contract accounts are much more interesting. Contract accounts act
as autonomouus agents which execute their contract code when sent messages.
A contract account can be programmed to automatically read and write to its
storage, send additional messages to other contract accounts, or create transac-
tions. To cause a contract account to execute its code exacts a monetary price
on the sender of the original message. This price is known as ”gas” and is pro-
portional to the complexity of the contract code. The money (Ether) provided
in the original message is used as gas to ”fuel” all contract code executions that
result from the first contract’s activation.
Contract code is written in a low level stack machine based bytecode lan-
guage called Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) code. The language makes use
of a stack, linear memory array and long term storage. The language is com-
posed of a small instruction set that includes blockchain applicaiton specific
instructions like CALL which sends a message to a contract and CREATE
which creates a new contract.
The blocks used by Ethereum are very similar to those used by Bitcoin.
Ethereum blocks contain all the information that a Bitcoin block does, with
the addition of a copy of the most recent ledger state, the block number and a
record of the mining difficulty for that block. Ethereum does not fundamentally
deviate from the typical proof-of-work consensus scheme.
4 Quantum Coins
A straightforward way to introduce quantum technology to the blockchain at
the cryptocurrency level is to simply reference the many schemes for quantum
money that have been defined since 1960 [9]. Bitcoin and Ether were described
in section 3 as the representations of monetary value that are traded between
parties through transactions. These coins have monetary value and crypto-
graphically protected ownership records. Coins are one of the primitive data
structures required to formulate a cryptocurrency blockchain.
4.1 Public-Key Quantum Money
In the case of public-key quantum money, the scheme takes advantage of super-
position to ensure that when a quantum state is used as a coin no bad actor can
duplicate the coin. An attacker cannot know which basis to measure each qubit
of the quantum state in without knowing the secret key which was originally
used to create the state. The attacker cannot learn the state without performing
the correct measurement due to the no-cloning restriction.
The procedure to generate public-key quantum money is very straightfor-
ward, and was originally introduced in 1960 by Stephen Wiesner [9]. This paper
arguably kicked off the field of quantum cryptography and directly inspired the
design of BB84 quantum key distribution [10].
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An algorithm for public-key quantum money generation is simply the fol-
lowing:
1. Generate two random bit strings M and N of length l
2. Prepare a quantum state |$ >= |0 >⊗l
3. For each bit i < l:
– If Mi = 0 and Ni = 0, do nothing to the i
th qubit
– If Mi = 0 and Ni = 1, rotate the i
th qubit state to |1 >
– If Mi = 1 and Ni = 0, rotate the i
th qubit state to |+ >
– If Mi = 1 and Ni = 1, rotate the i
th qubit state to |− >
Mi and Ni are kept secret by the mint, and |$ > is published as the quantum
public key. In this case, only the mint has enough knowledge to verify the public
key and no one can duplicate it.
4.2 Binding Commitments
Some of the mechanisms that were taken for granted in the description of clas-
sical blockchain technology are non-trivial to implement using quantum algo-
rithms. For example, we described in section 3.1 that a transaction requires
references to each UTXO involved and the cryptographic signatures produced
by the UTXO owners’ private keys. This information is necessary to validate
the ownership of the coins involved in the transaction. Using his/her private
key, the owner of the coins creates a digital signature so that other parties can
verify that the transaction was indeed authorized by the owner of the private
key and was not modified since. Using the corresponding public key and the
signature, any party can verify the validity of the transaction without learning
the private key. This is the basic premise of public-key cryptography.
A blockchain transaction using quantum money will still require references to
each UTXO involved and the cryptographic signatures produced by the UTXO
owners’ private keys in order to verify ownership. It makes sense to also require
that a user who has committed coins to a transaction in good faith must produce
his/her signature when it is time for the transaction to be approved. This would
make the creation of a transaction using quantum public-key money as coins a
type of binding commitment.
Computationally binding commitment schemes between two parties are com-
posed of two phases. The Commitment Phase allows one party to send the other
party some information c related to a message m which does not give the re-
ceiver any information about m itself. However, the act of sending c binds the
sender to provide the message m in the second stage, the Open Phase. In the
Open Phase, the sender transmits m to the receiver and proves to the receiver
that m does indeed correspond to c by providing a signature that ”opens c to
m”.
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A classical definition of a computationally binding is the following from
Unruh [11].
Definition 1 (Classical-style binding) No algorithm A can output a com-
mitment c and two signatures s, s’ that open c to two different messages m and
m’.
Computationally binding commitment schemes have been studied and de-
fined in the quantum setting [11, 20, 21, 22]. Interestingly, when the algorithm
A is allowed to be a quantum polynomial time algorithm, this definition was
shown to be inadequate. While definition 1 holds for a particular classical-style
binding commitment, Ambainis, Rosmanis, and Unruh showed that for this
particular binding a quantum polynomial time algorithm A employed by an ad-
versary could open c to any message that the adversary wished [12]. Therefore
Unruh was motivated to define a different type of binding that was useful in the
quantum case. The new binding property is demonstrated by a pair of quantum
games.
Let A, B be algorithms and S, M , U be quantum registers. Vc is a measure-
ment which verifies that that U opens M . Mok measures m in the computational
basis if ok = 1.
The first game Game1 consists of four steps:
(S,M,U, c)← A(1γ)
ok ← Vc(M,U)
m←Mok(M)
b← B(1γ , S,M,U)
The second game Game2 omits the measurement in step three but is other-
wise the same:
(S,M,U, c)← A(1γ)
ok ← Vc(M,U)
b← B(1γ , S,M,U)
A commitment scheme is ”collapse-binding” iff for any quantum polynomial
time valid adversary, cAdv = |Pr[b = 1 : Game1] − Pr[b = 1 : Game2]| is
negligible.
This essentially expresses that if an adversary (A,B) provides a classi-
cal commitment c, there must be only one message they can open c to. A
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outputs a superposition of messages M and a superposition of correspond-
ing opening signatures U . S is the adversary’s state. The assertion that
|Pr[b = 1 : Game1] − Pr[b = 1 : Game2]| is negligible limits the value of
M to computational basis vectors for collapse-binding commitments. No quan-
tum polynomial time algorithm B should be able to distinguish between the
value of M whether M is measured in the computational basis or not.
4.3 Collapsing Hash Functions
The games used to define the collapse-binding property of commitment schemes
can also be applied to classify hash functions that are collapsing [11]. Assume
H is a one-to-one hash function.
Definition 2 (Collapsing hash function - informal) H is a collapsing
hash function iff no quantum polynomial time algorithm B can distinguish be-
tween Game1 and Game2. An adversary is valid if A outputs a classical value
c and a register M where H(m) = c.
This game based definition was clarified and made mathematical by Fehr in
2018 [13].
Definition 3 (Collapsing hash function - formal) A function H X→ Y
is ∈(q)-collapsing if
cAdv[H](q) :=
sup
SMCU
δq(M,M |CU) ≤∈ (q)
for all q. The supremum is over all states SMCU = S H(M) CU with
complexity ≤ q.
The collapsing property of a hash function is a counterpart of collision re-
sistance. Unruh shows that the random quantum oracle is a collapsing hash
[11] and so some hash function based commitment schemes are collapsing in the
random oracle model. Unruh also showed that Merkle-Damgard hash functions
are collapsing if their underlying compression algorithms are, which implies that
SHA-2 is collapsing [14]. Czajkowski, et al. showed the same for Sponge hashes
with certain conditions [15]. Sponge hash construction underlies SHA-3.
4.4 Collision Free Quantum Money
Collision free quantum money is a concept that was introduced by Lutomirski,
et al. [16]. The premise is that a mint can not efficiently produce two coins with
the same verification circuit, and so each coin made is unique. This is a step
towards remedying the problem with Wiesner’s public-key quantum money. In
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Wiesner’s scheme, only the mint can verify the quantum public keys of minted
coins. This is an important issue specifically in the context of blockchain, since
the intention is specifically not to have a centralized signing authority in a
distributed system.
Let L be a classical function that assigns a unique label to each exponen-
tially small subset of a superset of elements. L should also be as obscure and
unstructured as possible. The procedure for generating collision free quantum
money is the following.
• Begin with an equal superposition over all n-bit strings.
• Compute L into an ancilla register and measure that register to obtain a
value l.
This procedure would have to be repeated exponentially many times to pro-
duce the same value l twice. The quantum state will then be |$l >, an equal
superposition of exponentially many terms with no clear relationship to one
another.
|$l >= 1√
Nl
∑
xs.t.L(x)=l
|x >
Verification can be done using rapidly mixing Markov chains. Verification
requires knowledge of a Markov matrix M that will rapidly mix from any distri-
bution over bit strings with the same l to the uniform distribution of those same
strings. No string with a different l can be present in that final uniform distri-
bution. Each update consists of a uniform random choice over N update rules
Pi. Each update rule is deterministic and invertible. Then any valid quantum
money state will be a +1 eigenstate of M .
Mr=˙
∑
l
|$l >< $l|
M =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi
The verification procedure makes use of a unitary U .
U =
∑
i
Pi ⊗ |i >< i|
The verification procedure itself is the following:
• Introduce an ancilla in uniform superposition over all i.
• apply U .
• Measure the projector of the ancilla onto the uniform superposition.
• discard the ancilla.
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The outcome 1 has a corresponding Kraus operator sum element:
(I ⊗ 1√
N
N∑
i=1
< i|)U(I ⊗ 1√
N
N∑
i=1
|i >)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi
= M
Repeating the procedure r times brings the Kraus operator to Mr, and
achieves an approximation of a measurement of
∑
l |$l >< $l|.
4.5 Quantum Lightning
A recent construction of quantum money is Quantum Lightning, which was
proposed by Zhandry in 2017 [17]. Quantum Lightning is a formalization of
collision free quantum money [16].
Quantum Lightning makes use of non-collapsing collision resistant hash func-
tions. These hash functions are defined by a random set of degree-2 polynomials
over F2. Quantum Lightning defines the ”Lightning Bolt” state | >. The veri-
fication procedure Ver for bolts is another polynomial time quantum algorithm
that either outputs the serial number of a valid bolt, or ⊥ for invalid bolts. The
serial number of a bolt is a deterministic function of the bolt itself, and verifi-
cation does not perturb the bolt. Bolts are created by a quantum algorithms
called ”Storms” and denoted ,.
A bolt is generated by the following procedure.
1. Randomly choose n random upper-triangular matrices Ai ∈ {0, 1}m×m,
and set A = {Ai}i. A is the public key. Let the hash function fA :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n be fA(x) = (xT · Ai · x)i. If we let operations be taken
mod 2, this captures general degree 2 functions over F2.
2. Begin with a state |φ0 >.
|φ0 >=
1
2kn/2
∑
∆1,...,∆k
|∆1, ...,∆k >
3. ∆ is defined such that we can run a computation which maps ∆ =
(∆1, ...,∆k) to an affine space S∆ s.t. ∀x ∈ S, fA(x) = fA(x + ∆j)∀j.
Then we construct a uniform superposition of elements in S∆ to yield:
|φ1 >=∑
∆
∑
x∈S∆
1
2kn/2
√|S∆| |∆, x >
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3. Compute fA in superposition and measure the resulting serial number y.
|φy >∝∑
∆,x∈S∆:fA(x)=y
1
|S∆| |x,∆ >
4. Compute the maps (x,∆1, ...,∆k) to (x, x−∆1, ..., x−∆k) in superposi-
tion. The final state is a bolt:
|y >∝∑
∆,x∈S∆:fA(x)=y
1
|S∆|
|x, x−∆1, ..., x−∆k >
=˙
∑
x0,...,xk:fA(xi)=y∀i
|x0, ..., xk >
= (
∑
x:fA(x)=y
|x >)⊗(k+1)
= |′y >⊗(k+1)
To verify a bolt, each of k+ 1 sets of the m registers is verified individually.
Each of these ”mini verifications” yields either an element in {0, 1}n or ⊥. Each
mini verification must agree, and have the same output for the bolt to be valid.
We assume the mini verification is given |φ >= |′y > that corresponds to
some serial number y. The first step of mini verification is to check if the input
state |φ > is in the space spanned by |′z > as z varies. The second step is
to evaluate fA in superposition in order to learn which of the orthogonal |′z >
states we have. Then, we can measure the result to obtain y. For the correct
|φ >= |′y > this does not perturb the state. This a useful property since it
means that a bolt can theoretically be re-used.
Quantum Lightning ensures that any bolt generated by an honest mint is
accepted with probability negligibly close to 1. It also ensures that no adver-
sarial bolt generator can generate two coins with the same serial number which
would both pass verification. Zhandry shows in [17] that Quantum Lightning
is secure under some assumptions of the multi-collision resistance of a degree-2
hash function. Zhandry also proved that any non-collapsing hash function can
be used to construct Quantum Lightning, though there are currently no such
known hash functions that are proven to be non-collapsing [17].
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5 A Hybrid Payment System
In February 2019, Coladangelo proposed a payment system based on Quantum
Lightning [18]. Quantum Lightning guarantees that no generation procedure
can easily create two coins with the same serial number, and no one can clone
existing coins. However, the Quantum Lightning scheme itself does not include
a mechanism for regulating the generation of valid coins. This mechanism is
introduced as a part of Coladangelo’s hybrid blockchain payment system.
This payment system is the first use of smart contracts in a quantum set-
ting. Any party can deposit a coin to a smart contract, setting that contract’s
serial number to match the coin’s. The classical certificate that can be found by
measuring a valid bolt can also be submitted to a smart contract. If a certifi-
cate submitted by a user corresponds to the serial number stored in the smart
contract, this means that the user owns bolt. The contract releases all of its
coins to the user.
Coladangelo’s payment system also considers one of the challenges with prac-
tical quantum computing: state decoherence. The downside of using quantum
states as coins are that these coins can’t be reliably stored for any significant
period of time. The payment system makes use of smart contracts to implement
a mechanism for lost coin recovery. A user can send a message to a smart con-
tract with a coin whose serial number is the serial number of a coin they have
lost. Other users have a time window in which they can challenge this claim by
demonstrating that they in fact own the coin with the submitted serial number.
If a claim is not challenged, then the coins submitted to the smart contract are
returned to the sender of the message, and the serial number of the contract is
updated to that of the lost coin.
5.1 Classical Blockchain
5.1.1 The Global Ledger
The payment system is primarily a classical blockchain, but uses Quantum
Lightning as its coins. The classical serial numbers and certificates of the quan-
tum coins are the interface between the quantum and classical elements of the
system. The classical blockchain uses a global ledger. The global ledger main-
tains three sets and the current time:
parties = {}
contracts = {}
allTransactions = {}
t = 0
FIG. 2. Ledger State
The messages that the global ledger can handle are the following. These are
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each slightly modified from those given by Coladangelo for clarity and consis-
tency of notation.
Register (id, num coins) → (pid) allows a user to set their id and retrieve
their pid, which addresses their data in the system. This constitutes the regis-
tration of a user with the system. This message can also include a number of
coins, which will be set on the registered party’s data structure.
Retrieve Party (pid) → (id, num coins) can be used to request a registered
party’s information.
Pay (pid, pid’, num coins) → (trid) allows user pid to send coins to user
pid’. If pid or pid’ are not valid, simply return ⊥. If pid’, pid ∈ parties and
*pid.coins > num coins, then:
∗pid′.coins← ∗pid′.coins+ num coins
∗pid.coins← ∗pid.coins− num coins
trid← |allT ransactions|+ 1
allT ransactions[trid]←
(pid, pid′, num coins, time)
Retrieve Transaction (trid) → (allTransactions[trid]) allows users to re-
trieve transaction details.
Smart Contract (pids, {(pid,num coinspid) : pid ∈ pids}, circuit, st0)→ (cid)
allows a user to create a contract. {(pid, num coinspid) : pid ∈ pids} are initial
deposits for each user pid. If pids ⊆ parties, then a new contract can be created.
Retrieve Smart Contract (cid)→ (params, coins) allows a user to retrieve
the details of a contract if cid ∈ contracts. Otherwise, returns ⊥.
5.1.2 Smart Contracts
The global ledger handles contract creation through the Smart Contract mes-
sage. However, the contracts themselves handle the most functional contract-
related messages.
The contract creation procedure is the following.
cid← |contracts|+ 1
∗cid.params←
(pids, {(pid, num coinspid) : pid ∈ pids},
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circuit, st0)
∗cid.num coins← 0
contracts[cid]← ∗cid
Once created, the contract waits for an Initialize with Coins message to come
from each user pid ∈ ∗cid.params.pids. If ∗pid.coins ≥ num coinspid ∀ pid ∈
∗cid.params.pids, then the following occurs.
∗pid.coins← ∗pid.coins− num coinspid
∀ pid ∈ ∗cid.params.pids
∗cid.coins← ∗cid.coins+ num coinspid
∀ pid ∈ ∗cid.params.pids
st← st0
The smart contract then enters the ”execution phase”: a loop which repeats
until termination. The contract waits for a Trigger message from any user pid ∈
parties. This message will provide variables (pid, witness, time, st, num coins).
If circuit(pid, witness, time, st, num coins) 6= ⊥, then the following occurs.
∗pid.coins← ∗pid.coins− num coins
∗cid.coins← ∗cid.coins+ num coins
(st, result)← circuit(pid, witness, time,
st, num coins)
The result will indicate how many coins the smart contract should release
to user pid.
∗pid.coins← ∗pid.coins+ num coins
∗cid.coins← ∗cid.coins− num coins
Initialize with Coins (pid, cid, num coins) → () allows a user to deposit
coins into a contract. This is necessary for a contract to enter its execution
phase. If cid /∈ contracts or pid /∈ ∗cid.params.pids, returns ⊥. Otherwise, the
following occurs.
∗cid.coins← num coins
∗pid.coins← num coins
Trigger (pid, cid, witness, time, st, num coins) → (result) allows a
user to run the circuit associated with a contract with the given parameters. If
cid /∈ contracts, returns ⊥. pid may be any element of parties.
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5.2 Quantum Lightning Payments
In this hybrid blockchain scheme, we have not yet mentioned any use of quan-
tum physics. Indeed, the ledger and contracts in Coladangelo’s scheme are com-
pletely classical. The only element of the system which makes use of quantum
effects is the payments system, which is uses Quantum Lightning as a primitive.
Coladangelo’s payment system defines five procedures:
• generate valid quantum coins
• make a payment
• file a claim for lost coins
• prevent malicious attempts at filing claims
• trade valid quantum coins for classical coins
5.2.1 Generating Valid Quantum Coins
The procedure uses the Quantum Lightning Bolt generation procedure , and
bolt verification procedure Ver both defined by Zhandry [17], which are included
in section 4.5.
| >←,
serial← Ver(| >)
Then to use created coins with the blockchain, the Smart Contract message
may be sent to the global ledger to create a contract. Once this message has
been processed, an Initialize with Coins message is also sent to the ledger with
the cid matching the contract created by the Smart Contract message.
5.2.2 Making a Payment
A payment involves two parties, the payer P and payee P ′. The payment
procedure involves the following steps.
• P sends | >, cid, serial and num coins to P ′.
• P ′ sends a Retrieve Contract message to the ledger, retrieving the contract
cid.
• P ′ accepts the payment if cid ∈ contracts and Ver(| >) = serial.
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5.2.3 Recovering Lost Coins
In order to recover lost coins, a user P uses the Trigger message to cause a smart
contract to execute a circuit BanknoteLost. This circuit records a request at the
current time to ∗cid.state, indicating that a BanknoteLost message began to
be processed at this time. With the Trigger message, user P also provides the
serial number serial of the lost coin, and deposits a number of coins num coins
into the contract cid.
During the time ttr that follows, another user P
′ has the chance to challenge
the claim made by P by demonstrating true ownership of the coin with the
serial number serial. Recall that a bolt of Quantum Lightning is generated
using degree-2 polynomial hash function H. If P ′ has access to the bolt, they
can verify it through a verification procedure A which will identify only their
one, unique bolt and yield some m ∈ {0, 1}λ such that H(m) = serial.
To challenge the claim made by P , P ′ can perform the following new bolt
generation and verification:
m← A(| >)
| >←,
serial′ ← Ver(| >)
Then, P ′ sends a Trigger message to the contract with m and serial′, run-
ning a circuit ChallengeClaim which causes the lost coin recovery record to be
erased from the contract’s state and the coins deposited by P to be returned.
If a claim made by P goes unchallenged for time ttr, P can perform the
bolt generation and verification procedure and send a Trigger message to the
contract with the new coin’s serial number serial′, which will run a circuit
ClaimUnchallenged. This circuit simply updates the contract’s serial number to
be the new bolt’s and removes the record of the recovery request.
5.2.4 Trading a Valid Quantum Coin for a Classical Coin
If a user P owns a quantum coin and wishes to redeem it for classical coins,
they can demonstrate ownership by performing m← A(| >), and then sending
a Trigger message which contains m and runs a circuit RecoverCoins. The
RecoverCoins circuit releases the coins which were originally deposited in the
contract by P back to P .
6 A Quantum Blockchain Voting Protocol
Sun, Xin, et al. presented a protocol for voting on a quantum blockchain in
January 2019 [19]. Voting can be a suitable application of blockchain technology
since the blockchain makes it difficult for participants to falsify claims. Sun,
Xin, et al. make use of quantum commitments to design a self-tallying voting
protocol.
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6.1 Voting Using Binding Commitments
The protocol is very simple. Like the other commitment schemes discussed in
section 4.2 of this paper, the voting protocol involves two phases. These phases
are called the ”ballot commitment” and ”ballot tallying” phases.
The steps to the ballot commitment phase are the following.
1. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n} voter Vi generates the ith row of an n×n matrix of
integers ri,1, ..., ri,n such that
∑
j rio,j = 0(mod n+ 1).
2. For each i, j voter Vi sends ri,j to voter Vj via a quantum secure commu-
nication.
3. Then each voter Vi knows the i
th column r1,i, ..., rn,i. Vi computes his/her
masked ballot vˆi = vi +
∑
j rj,i(mod n+ 1). Vi commits vˆi to every tallier
of the blockchain via a quantum commitment protocol.
Ballots are tallied by the following decommitment procedure. vi = 0 is
considered a disagreement with the proposal being voted on, vi = 1 is considered
an agreement.
1. Each voter Vi reveals vˆi to every tallier of the blockchain by opening
his/her commitment.
2. The talliers each run the Quantum Honest Success Byzantine Agreement
Protocol to reach a consensus on the value of the masked ballot vˆ1, ..., vˆn.
3. The result of the vote is
∑
i vˆi =
∑
i vi(mod n+ 1).
6.2 Handling Dishonest Ballot Talliers
A Quantum Honest Success Byzantine Agreement Protocol (QHBA) is used in
their voting scheme to identify dishonest ballot talliers.
Definition 5 (Honest success Byzantine agreement protocol (HBA))
An honest success Byzantine agreement protocol involves n agents. One of the
agents is the sender S, and holds an input value xs ∈ D, where D is a finite
domain. A protocol achieves honest success Byzantine agreement if the protocol
guarantees the following:
1. If the sender is honest, then all honest agents agree on the same output
value y = xs.
2. If the sender is dishonest, then either all honest receivers abort the proto-
col, or all honest receivers decide on the same output value y ∈ D.
The protocol is p-resilient if the protocol works when less than a fraction of p
receivers are dishonest.
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The QHBA is m−2m -resilient. m is the number of receivers, and is more
efficient than a classical HBA protocol when there are many dishonest receivers
[19].
6.2.1 Distribution of Correlated Lists
The first phase of the QHBA protocol is for correlated lists to be distributed
among the agents using quantum secure direct communication.
Let the sender be S = P1. Each agent Pi ∈ {Pn2 +1, ..., Pn} is tasked with
distributing a list of numbers Lik to agent Pk ∈ {P1, ..., Pn2 } such that:
1. |Lik| = l ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., n/2}, where l is a multiple of 6.
2. Li1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}l. l3 numbers on Li1 are 0. l3 are 1. l3 are 2.
3. Lik ∈ {0, 1}l ∀ k ∈ {2, ..., n/2}
4. ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., l}, if Li1[j] = 0, then Li2[j] = ... = Lin/2[j] = 0
5. ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., l}, if Li1[j] = 1, then Li2[j] = ... = Lin/2[j] = 1
6. ∀ j ∈ {1, ..., l}, if Li1[j] = 2, then ∀ k ∈ {2, ...,m} the probability that
Lik[j] = 0 and that L
i
k[j] = 1 are equal.
If the number of receivers that report non-compliant lists from a distributor
passes a threshold, then that distributor is classified as dishonest.
6.2.2 Sequential Composition List Formation
Let the number of honest distributors be h. Then the agents perform the fol-
lowing sequential composition.
L1 = L
n/2+1
1 , ..., L
n/2+h
1
L2 = L
n/2+1
2 , ..., L
n/2+h
2
...
Ln/2 = L
n/2+1
n/2 , ..., L
n/2+h
n/2
The constructed sequential composition of correlated lists is then L.
L = (L1, ..., Ln/2)
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6.2.3 Consensus
Assuming h > n2 , the following procedure can be used to reach a consensus.
First, the sender S sends a binary number b1,k and a list of numbers ID1,k
to each receiver Pk. ID1,k should indicate all the positions on L1 where b1,k
appears to Pk. An honest sender will send the same list to all receivers.
Each Pk will compare the b1,k and ID1,k to their list Lk. If any honest Pk
finds information that is not consistent, then Pk sends ⊥ to the other receivers.
Otherwise, Pk sends b1,k and ID1,k to the other receivers.
After all these messages have been received, each honest Pk checks the fol-
lowing:
1. If there were more than two agents who sent binary numbers and lists
that were consistent with Lk but some had different binary numbers, Pk
outputs ⊥.
2. If more than two agents sent the same binary numbers and lists which
were consistent with Lk, these agents are considered to be honest. Pk
outputs the binary number provided by these honest agents.
3. If more than two agents sent the same binary numbers and lists which
were consistent with Lk, any other agents are considered dishonest. If all
of the dishonest agents sent ⊥ to Pk, then Pk sets vk to the binary value
provided by the honest agents.
4. In all other cases, Pk outputs ⊥.
Consensus is achieved if at least n4 agents output the same bit value.
Suppose Pj were a dishonest receiver, and j ≥ 2. Pj would want to send a
binary number bj,k and list of numbers IDj,k which was consistent with Lk.On
Lj , there are
l
2 appearances of bj,k. On L1 there are only
l
3 appearances of
bj,k. So, there are
l
6 positions of discord x, where L1[x] = 2. If Pj selects a
discord position x then with probability 12 , Lk[x] 6= bj,k. Pj has to avoid all
discord positions in order to avoid being identified as dishonest. This has a
( 23 )
l
3 probability of success which is very small when l is large. This is rationale
behind the checks made by Pk listed above.
7 Quantum Blockchain Using Entanglement in
Time
Rajan, Del, and Matt Visser published a quantum system design that uses time
entanglement to replace the data structure component of blockchain technology
[20]. Their approach uses the nonseparability of entangled photons to simulate
the links between blocks of data. The approach addresses the issue of blockchain
scalability using quantum effects.
Multipartite states like the GHZ entangled state are used to create a chained
data structure. In the most trivial example of the approach, the contents of a
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block might be represented by a pair of bits r1r2. These contents are encoded
into a temporal Bell state i.e.
|βr1r2 >0,τ=
1√
2
(|00 > |rτ2 > +(−1)r1 |10 > |r¯2τ >)
As records are created, they are encoded as blocks into temporal Bell states.
These photons are created and absorbed at their respective times.
|β00 >0,τ , |β10 >τ,2τ , |β11 >2τ,3τ , etc.
The bit strings of the Bell states are then effectively ”chained” together
using entanglement in time. This is accomplished using a fusion process: Bell
states are recursively projected into a growing temporal GHZ state. This can
be accomplished using an entangled photon-pair production source, a delay line
and a Polarizing Beam Splitter (PBS). For example, two Bell states could be
fused into the four photon GHZ state:
|ψ+ >0,0a,b ⊗|ψ+ >τ,τa,b
delay−−−→ |ψ+ >0,τa,b ⊗|ψ+ >τ,2τa,b =
1
2
(|h0avτb > +|v0ahτb >)⊗ (|hτav2τb > +|vτah2τb >)
PBS−−−→ 1
2
(|h0avτb vτah2τb > +|v0ahτbhτav2τb >) = |GHZ >0,τ,τ,2τ
The four photons propagate in their own spatial modes and exist at different
times, but are time entangled. The state of the blockchain at a given time t = nτ
is:
|GHZr1r2...r2n >0,τ,τ,2τ,2τ,...,(n−1)τ,(n−1)τ,nτ)
=
1√
2
(|00rτ2rτ3 ...rnτ2n > +(−1)r1 |10r¯2τ r¯3τ ... ¯r2nnτ >)
This state contains the classical information r1r2...r2n. This information
can be decoded without measuring the full photon statistics or detecting the
photons [21]. The scalability issue is addressed since ”any number of photons
can be generated with the same setup, solving the scalability problem caused by
the previous need for extra resources. Consequently, entangled photon states of
larger numbers than before are practically realizable” [22].
8 Discussion
Ever since Wiesner’s proposal of public-key quantum money in 1960 [9], quan-
tum cryptography has been an active area of research. However, the topic of
quantum blockchain is still relatively new. This is clear from a simple search
for papers using the keywords ”Quantum” and ”Blockchain”. There has been
a steep, almost exponential, increase in publications over the last three years.
21
There are still many open questions in the area. Ongoing research has identified
and introduced new unanswered questions.
We are now beginning to see blockchain technology beong adopted and
trusted for critical government processes. For example, a prominent blockchain
company ConsenSys Systems [23] has partnered with an initiative created by
His Highness Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and
Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai to use blockchain widely in
Dubai [24]. They released a whitepaper at the World Government Summit of
2017 entitled ”Building the Hyperconnected Future on Blockchains” [25]. Some
companies that believe in the fundamental potential of decentralized governance
like ConsenSys have endeavored to bring blockchain technology to areas of soci-
ety that could be improved in some way by decentralization, with some success.
ConsenSys has supported projects in decentralized journalism [26], law [27],
digital asset economy [28], supply chains [29] and more.
The longevity of technology that will impact our most important societal
structures is worth questioning. There are critical issues with the scaling prop-
erties and efficiency of these blockchain technologies which require solutions
if any significant distributed ledgers are going to be sustainably implemented.
The scaling properties of the immutable distributed data structures used in
blockchain networks have been shown to cause demands on memory that are
hard to justify. Blockchains that are based on proof-of-work consensus schemes
like Bitcoin also encourage massively wasteful resource consumption. Competi-
tion in Bitcoin’s computationally-intensive scheme coupled with the limitations
of the blockchain data structure implementation by Bitcoin also causes issues
with throughput of the system as a practical trading platform. The number
of transactions that can be processed by Bitcoin is less than seven per second.
This is far from the reported 47,000 per second achieved by VISA [30].
These issues have motivated some pushback against the spread of blockchain.
China is seeking to stop Bitcoin mining in the country, for example [31]. From a
business perspective, blockchain technology is not expected to be viable for full
adoption and practical use by mainstream banks for around another ten years
[32]. Even so, banks are beginning to implement prototypes and blockchain
applications of limited scale now. An IBM survey of 200 global banks [33]
showed that 65% of these banks intended to roll out blockchain-based products
between 2016 and 2019.
The majority of blockchain applications that are being developed do not have
solutions to the scalability and efficiency issues of their underlying cybersecurity
schemes. They are also not prepared to face the challenges of attackers equipped
with the quantum computers we expect to see developed within the next ten
to twenty years. Companies are laying the groundwork now for technology that
will become fundamentally tied to our most important societal structures, and
this technology must be poised for viability in the quantum age. This is what
has motivated efforts by companies like NXM Labs to introduce autonomous
security protocols which can adapt and be securely updated to accommodate
new challenges in the future [34]. This is also what has motivated the Quantum
Resistant Ledger project [35].
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In this review, we have focused on work that attempts to harness quan-
tum computing to improve blockchain technology. These efforts are currently
theoretical frameworks, but future quantum computing infrastructure may en-
able their realization. Their attempts to address the security and efficiency of
blockchain crytocurrencies [9, 10, 16, 17], security primitives [11, 12, 13, 14],
smart contracts [18], consensus algorithms [19], and data structures [20] will
inform and direct the future implementations of quantum blockchain technolo-
gies.
Quantum money was arguably one of the first ideas that kickstarted the
entire field of quantum cryptography in 1960 [9]. The inherent security of infor-
mation stored in quantum states using conjugate coding [9] brings clear benefit
to cryptocurrencies. Wiesner’s basic scheme inspired the notable work of Ben-
nett and Brassard’s BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [10], among many
other foundational works in the field. However, the conjugate coding scheme is
not perfect for every use. Hence, improvements have been made such as the idea
of collision-resistant quantum money introduced by Lutomirski, Andrew, et al
[16] and Zhandry’s Quantum Lightning framework [17]. Despite its long history,
quantum money still comes with some unanswered questions. Zhandry proved
that any non-collapsing hash function can be used to construct Quantum Light-
ning. However, there are currently no known hash functions that are proven to
be non-collapsing [17]. It is an open question whether suitable hash functions
could be constructed from better-known assumptions, such as the hardness of
lattice problems.
Secure communication primitives have been relevant for work in quantum
blockchain technology research. We have summarized the key points of founda-
tional work on binding quantum commitment schemes [11, 12, 13, 14]. Bind-
ing commitments underlie collision-resistant quantum money, Quantum Light-
ning. In turn, these are the primitives used by Coledangelo’s hybrid quantum
blockchain design [18]. Coledangelo’s is one of the first hybrid quantum/classi-
cal blockchain designs, and notably addresses the issue of decohering quantum
money by introducing a novel method for a blockchain participant to prove that
they once owned a quantum coin. The design also includes a concept of arbi-
trary smart contracts much like Ethereum’s. Open questions that remain for
hybrid blockchain designers include the problem of ensuring the trustworthiness
of arbitrary smart contract code and the hardness of the classical blockchain
security elements against quantum attacks, among others.
The consensus algorithm presented by Sun, Xin, et al. [19] is a simple
approach to consensus which is adapted for use in a quantum blockchain. Their
work demonstrates that consensus can be elegantly simple. Comparing the
scaling characteristics of their scheme to those of other consensus algorithms
may be useful for future works. Rajan, Del, and Matt Visser’s blockchain data
structure using entanglement in time [20] is an interesting, new perspective
on quantum blockchain. Using a partially quantum mechanical data structure
for blockchain may enable hybrid blockchain technologies to take advantage of
effects such as entanglement swapping using photons [22], and many violations of
local realism. Whether it will become practical from an engineering or economic
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point of view to harness these effects on a large scale is yet to be determined.
The goal of this review was to provide a summary of current quantum
blockchain research that can help to guide future work. There is huge potential
for combining quantum resources with blockchain technology for applications
in a variety of sectors including finance, healthcare, manufacturing and other
areas where data security in a distributed network is of importance. We hope
that this review will provide a resource to researchers from these different fields
and enable further research and development.
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